Marilyn J. Durfee v. Frank W. Durfee : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Marilyn J. Durfee v. Frank W. Durfee : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Respondent.
J. Franklin Allred; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Marilyn J. Durfee v. Frank W. Durfee, No. 890221 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1785
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A"»0 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
W-tU CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARILYN J. DURFEE (WOLF) 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
FRANK W. DURFEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
* 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 890221 - CA 
PRIORITY NO. 14 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a final Judgment and Order entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Honorable Pat Brian 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
fn-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARILYN J. DURFEE (WOLF) * 
Plaintiff/Respondent * 
vs. * 
FRANK W. DURFEE, * 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 890221 - CA 
PRIORITY NO. 14 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a final Judgment and Order entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Honorable Pat Brian 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
84102 
CONTENTS 
Statement of Issues 1 
1. Did the court appropriately find that there had been a 
material change of circumstances not contemplated in the 
original decree of divorce? 1 
2. Did the court appropriately apply the support guidelines 
then in effect at the time of trial from which this appeal is 
taken? 1 
3. Was the court entitled to take judicial notice of the impact 
of a child's increased age on the amount of support awarded? 1 
Statement of Facts 1 
Summary of Argument 3 
Point 1 4 
The court appropriately found that there had been a material 
change of circumstances not contemplated in the original 
decree of divorce 4 
Point II 6 
The court appropriately applied the support guidelines in 
effect at the time of trial 6 
Point III 11 
The court was entitled to take judicial notice of the impact of a 
child's increased age on the amount of support awarded, and 
even if such were error, it is harmless due to the availability 
of supportive uncontested evidence 11 
Commentary on Appellant's Brief 15 
Conclusions 18 
AUTHORITIES 
Coleman v. Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983) 17 
Craven v. Craven. 229 P.2d 301 (Utah 1951) 14 
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980) 4, 5 
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983) 5, 16 
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985) 5, 16 
Wiker v. Wiker. 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978) 16 
Wright v Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978), 14 
Wvman v. Wallace. 615 P.2d 452 (Washington 1980) 12 
ii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the court appropriately find that there had been a material 
change of circumstances not contemplated in the original decree of 
divorce? 
2. Did the court appropriately apply the support guidelines then 
in effect at the time of trial from which this appeal is taken? 
3. Was the court entitled to take judicial notice of the impact of a 
child's increased age on the amount of support awarded? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in 1978. (T. 62) The plaintiff/respondent 
was awarded custody of the only two children of that marriage, Craig and 
Chris, both boys who were respectively two and six years old at that time. 
(T. 62-63 )From that time to the present both children remained in the 
plaintiffs custody. (T. 63) The older boy, Craig has spent the school year 
with his maternal Grandparents and spends summers with his mother, the 
plaintiff/respondent. (T. 42, 64-65) In the ensuing years following the 
divorce in 1978, expenses for support of the two boys have increased. 
Their respective ages are now 12 and 16. Increased expenses of 
support include clothing, food, school activities and medical expenses. (T. 
67) The plaintiff/respondent has had to pay over $300 for orthodontic care 
as a down payment, and an additional $74 per month. (T. 68-69) The 
defendant/appellant was required under the terms of the original decree of 
divorce to pay $150 per month for the support of each child. That sum, 
according to uncontradicted testimony given by the plaintiff/respondent, is 
turned over in its entirety to Craig's grandmother by mail, with whom he 
spends the school year. (T. 72) The plaintiff/respondent further gave 
uncontradicted and uncontroverted testimony that the cost of supporting 
Chris was at the time of trial $500 per month, and the cost of supporting 
Craig was $600 per month. In responding to evidence elicited by counsel 
for the appellant, which attempted to allocate a fixed dollar amount for 
raising the subject children (T. 75-84), the court stated: 
The court can take judicial notice that once a kid 
reaches his teenage years, he is more expensive to 
rear than when he is a toddler. Anybody that's 
had teenage kids knows that. This court has had 
six of them. It will take judicial notice of that 
fact. 
(T. 84) Importantly, counsel for appellant did not object to the court's 
taking judicial notice of increased expense in rearing teenagers versus 
toddlers. 
The appellant/respondent attempted to skew the calculations solicited 
by the court based upon the then valid support guidelines by using a figure 
of four children when in fact all he had were both of the children in 
question and a third child by his second marriage. (T. 107) The 'fourth' 
child was a child voluntarily raised by the defendant/appellant. 
With reference to its including a totality of criteria in its findings 
and conclusions, the court stated: 
[T]he court, in its analysis today, has focused on 
bottom-line figures, understanding that if the cost 
of living has gone up in the defendant's 
household, and thus his disposable income may be 
the same or less, that cost of living has gone up in 
a corresponding manner in the plaintiffs 
household, and the disposable income would 
probably be subject to the same criteria. 
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(T. 108) The court then went on to indicate that the defendant had 
experienced a material, substantial change of circumstances since the 1978 
divorce decree was entered. The court further found that the 
plaintiff/respondent was at the time of modification rearing two boys who 
were ten years older than at the time of the original decree, and that the 
defendant was making approximately $29,000 in 1978 and made about 
$45,000 at the time of modification. That was found to be an average 
increase of about $1,600 per year. Furthermore, the court had no reason 
to believe that it would not continue to so rise in the future. The court then 
concluded that a modification was justified, and that the amount of increase 
to be paid by the defendant would be calculated by the guidelines. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Proceedings calling for the modification of divorce decrees granting 
child support, pursuant to the continuing jurisdiction of Utah courts in such 
matters, are proceedings in equity. As such, the trial court has liberal 
discretion and its findings and conclusions will be disturbed only upon a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion on appeal. In the present appeal, the 
appellant has failed to make such a showing. 
The court below need only find one material change to justify 
the modification of a support award, but in fact found two. First, the court 
found that the annual income of the defendant rose at an average rate of 
$1,600 per year, while the plaintiff/respondent was unemployed. (T. 108) 
Second, the court found that, as a matter of judicial notice, both of the 
children of the marriage had grown from toddlers to teenagers, and with 
that change in age came an increase in costs associated with support. If on 
appeal, either of these is found to be a material change of circumstances, 
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then the failure of the other to be so termed is not fatal to 
plaintiff/respondent's cause, since such is not prejudicial error; there was 
under that circumstance the necessary material change of circumstances. 
Once there has been a material change found, the court continues to 
exercise a broad and liberal discretion in determining what level of support 
is appropriate. The court below elected to set the support amount for 
Chris and Craig at that level established by the uniform guidelines. 
Having found a material change of circumstances not contemplated 
in the Decree at the time of the original decree, the court properly 
modified the amount of child support paid by the defendant/appellant. 
Such is consistent with the laws of this state, and there is, in this course of 
actions, no abuse of the court's equitable discretion. 
POINT I 
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY FOUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MATERIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONTEMPLATED IN THE ORIGINAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The appellant did not set forth the proper standard of review in 
matters of equity in its brief. The appropriate standard was set forth in 
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
"Under Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in 
equity so far as child custody, support payments, 
and the like are concerned, [citations omitted] It 
likewise retains continuing jurisdiction over the 
parties, and power to make equitable 
redistribution or other modification of the 
original decree as equity might dictate. In both 
the formulation of the original decree and any 
modifications thereof, the trial court is vested 
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with broad discretionary powers, which may be 
disturbed by an appellate court only in the 
presence of clear abuse thereof. 
Despain at 1305-1306. 
In order to exercise its discretionary powers of equity in modifying 
support awarded in an original decree of divorce, the trial court must find 
a material change of circumstance. In one of only two cases, the second of 
which (Hunter) seems of dubious value for the purposes of these 
proceedings, appellant correctly cites the rule of law governing the 
modification of a decree of divorce: 
On a petition for a modification of a divorce 
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a 
showing of a material change of circumstances 
occurring since the entry of the decree and not 
contemplated in the decree itself. 
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985) at 701, see also appellant's 
brief at 14. The appellant, in the same spot in his brief, admits to a 2.7% 
increase in the defendant's annual gross income, and states that "such a 
modest increase in salary was not contemplated by the parties at the time of 
the entry of the decree of divorce." (id-) hi making such a statement, 
appellant misapplies the rule cited above from Stettler. The material 
change required is not one that "was contemplated by the parties", but 
rather is one not contemplated in the decree itself. Appellant has made no 
reference to any provision of the decree contemplating whatsoever an 
increase in appellant's salary or annual gross income. The appellant 
therefore has failed to demonstrate that this 'modest' increase in gross 
income was contemplated in the decree. Because the decree itself made no 
provisions for altering the amount of child support awarded based upon 
5 
changes in the gross income of the appellant, such a change in income was 
not contemplated in the decree itself. (See Appendix "A", Decree of 
Divorce) Therefore, if the change is found to be material under the broad 
discretion allocated to the trial court, and if that material change was not 
contemplated in the decree itself, such a finding satisfies the threshold 
requirement stated above. That is the case in this appeal. The court made 
a finding that the change in income was material, and such was founded 
upon evidence properly received. In light of no clear abuse of discretion, 
the findings of the court should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE SUPPORT GUIDELINES IN 
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
The support guidelines in force at the time of the modification 
represent a conscious effort at scientific fact finding as exercised by the bar 
and the judiciary, assisted by sociological data. Judge Judith Billings, chair 
of the Utah Child Support Task Force, referring to the guidelines stated: 
[The guidelines] represent a major step forward in 
providing predictable and uniform child support 
awards statewide. 
(As quoted in "News - Administrative Office of the Courts, p. 1) The 
amount and quality of scientific evidence incorporated into the 
development of the guidelines is significant. Prompted by concerns voiced 
by the Board of District Judges, the Task Force was organized, and was 
composed of judges, lawyers, legislators, economists, professors and 
representatives of public interest groups. (See May 1988 guidelines, p. 1) 
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During a course of regular hearings, the Task Force heard testimony from 
many parents during July 1987. The Task Force reviewed guidelines in 
place in many other states. The report of the task force states that "recent 
studies indicate that child support awards are critically deficient when 
measured against the economic costs of child rearing." Qd.) A 1985 study 
estimated that $27.5 billion in support would be due and owing in 1985, 
while a Census Bureau study indicated that only 70% of support awards is 
actually collected. The same study reported that the mean court-ordered 
support obligation in 1985 was $199 per month for 1.8 children, while the 
poverty standard was $273 per month for the same 1.8 children. Another 
study indicated that an order for $191 per month for a child of a middle 
income family is equivalent to 25% of the average expenditures on that 
child. All of this data pointed to the need for the adoption of uniform 
guidelines. 
The Task Force proceeded in developing guidelines by referring to 
those employed in other states and by analyzing three models employed in 
formulating guidelines, the cost-sharing model, the income equalization 
method, and the income shares model. Of the states which have adopted 
guidelines within the last two years, over one half have followed the 
income shares model, which attempts to fix an award which reflects the 
same proportion of parental income following the divorce that they would 
have received had there been no divorce. This approach has been favored 
because it assumes in its formulas that both parents have an obligation to 
support the child or children in question, and it bases the actual support 
awarded on the relative income available to each parent. In order to 
continue with this balances approach, the figures represented in the 
schedules formulated assume that the custodial parent receives the tax 
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exemptions for the children, reducing proportionally the amount of 
support paid by the non-custodial spouse. Such guidelines reflect serious 
study of the subject and an analysis of the need of Utah children, while 
keeping in mind the relative capacity of the parents to pay support. The 
appellant argues that for the judge to adopt the recommendations of the 
guidelines is reversible error, but fails to establish a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
In addressing existing orders, the Task Force made two principal 
comments. First, that simply because the current support paid under an 
existing decree of divorce is less than that called for in the guidelines, such 
does not, of itself, constitute a material change of circumstances. Second, 
that existing orders should be considered on a case by case basis, by 
reviewing the totality of present circumstances at the time of modification 
to avoid working an undue hardship on the parents. The reasons for the 
first comments are obvious. The Task Force did not wish to create a flood 
of modification hearings by the stroke of a pen, in adopting and 
promulgating the guidelines. The reasons for the second are equally 
obvious. The Task Force did not want members of the judiciary to apply 
the guidelines to existing orders unless such was warranted by present 
circumstances. 
The totality of present circumstances referred to in the guidelines 
cannot refer to a totality of aU circumstances, but only of those relevant to 
the amount of support, if any, to be awarded. The legislature of this state, 
which also contributed to the promulgation of the guidelines, has 
established by statute certain criteria, each of which was appropriately 
considered by the court. Because the court received and reviewed evidence 
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on these points, it considered the "totality" of the "present circumstances." 
The factors established by the legislature are: 
1) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
2) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
3) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
4) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
5) The need of the obligee: 
6) The age of the parties; 
7) The responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
(Taken from Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2); See also Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744 
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) at 1023) These factors were present before 
the court as admitted evidence, and the court made specific findings on all 
of them but that of the age of the parties, although that fact was apparent to 
the court, and there is no factor of age which could be used to defeat the 
court's findings in any case. The court, at T. 108 - 111 entered findings 
which are encapsulated herein: 
1) The plaintiff/respondent was at the time of 
modification unemployed. [Although one might 
argue that she could become income-producing in 
the future, such is not only speculative, but moves 
beyond the realm of present circumstances.] 
2) The defendant/appellant had experienced a 
material change of circumstances in that his 
annual income had increased from about $29,000 
in 1978 to about $45,000 at the time of the 
modification, representing a rather constant trend 
of increase amounting to an average of $1,600 per 
year. 
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3) The court found that the factors affecting 
disposable or discretionary income in the 
defendant/appellant's household were substantially 
the same as those affecting the 
plaintiff/respondent's household. 
4) The court order the calculation of the amount 
under the guidelines to be based upon a three-
child calculation.! 
Thus, the court considered specifically those relevant factors established by 
the legislature. Importantly, the court used a three child calculation, since 
it was not the legal responsibility of the defendant/appellant to support the 
alleged fourth child. Thus, the court below made a thorough investigation 
of the situation of the parties and the children, and modified the award 
amount based upon its review of the totality of present circumstances. 
Contrary to what appellant argues, discretionary income, considered alone, 
is not proof of either hardship, or of a failure to consider this case on a 
"case by case" basis in view of the totality of present circumstances. 
Appellant should note that the guidelines specify that the court modifying 
existing orders should consider the totality of present circumstances of the 
parties and not only of the obligor. The court did so, finding that their 
discretionary incomes were equally impacted by similar if not identical 
external factors. 
The court below, having found a material change of circumstances 
by viewing the totality of present circumstances under the guidelines 
1
 Appellant claims that there should be a fourth child employed in the calculation. 
However, this "child" is not a "child" as defined by appropriate statute and case law. The 
appellant voluntarily assumed responsibility for the support of this fourth "child". As 
stated in Wright v. Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978), even stepchildren cannot defeat a 
parents obligation to support a child pursuant to a decree of divorce, for "the undertaking to 
support stepchildren does not relieve the parent of his obligation to support his own natural 
children." (Wright at 445) 
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themselves and the dictates of case law and statute, concluded that the 
application of the guidelines to the present situation was appropriate. For 
the judge below to have moved against the scientific evidence marshalled in 
the formulation of the guidelines without some important reason not to 
have followed the guidelines would indeed have constituted a clear abuse of 
discretion. The fact that the court did follow the guidelines given the 
evidence presented is likewise indicative of the court's proper 
acknowledgement of the extensive data and fact-finding incorporated into 
the guidelines. 
Appellant urges an abuse of discretion due to the failure of the court 
to base the award not upon the gross annual income of the appellant, but 
upon the discretionary income of the appellant. Appellant fails to cite even 
one case which applied discretionary income as the appropriate measure of 
comparison between the parents in determining support awards. 
Respondent has reviewed the available case law and has failed to find even 
one case, which appellant could cite to support his argument. The 
guidelines themselves specify the gross income is the appropriate measure 
for a determination of an award pursuant to the guidelines. In so doing, 
the judge acted in keeping with the mandates of the community as 
represented on the Task Force and at its hearings, in conformity with case 
law, and in conformity with the law of this state. Appellant's argument on 
this point is without merit. 
POINT III 
THE COURT WAS ENTITLED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE IMPACT OF A 
CHILD'S INCREASED AGE ON THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT AWARDED. AND 
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EVEN IF SUCH WERE ERROR. IT IS HARMLESS DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF 
SUPPORTIVE UNCONTESTED EVIDENCE. 
In his brief, appellant misstates the appropriate test of law for 
judicial notice according to the facts of the present case. Appellant cites the 
legal test applicable to adjudicative facts, not the test for the judicial notice 
of legislative facts. The fundamental difference between to the two is quite 
simple: adjudicative facts refer to specifics, such as the location of Salt 
Lake City, or of Sugarhouse, whereas Legislative facts refer to statistical 
sorts of conclusion, such as a legislature or task force might make 
following a series of hearings and studies on a particular subject, much like 
the effort which went into the formulation of the support guidelines. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the propriety of judicially noticing a 
legislative fact, we should note that the court did not base its determination 
of a material change of circumstances exclusively on the judicially noticed 
fact of the increased expense of supporting the children due to their growth 
into teenagers, but based its finding of a material change upon the obvious 
and substantial increase in the defendant's income as well. Taken 
individually or separately, there was nevertheless a material change of 
circumstances not contemplated in the decree of divorce itself. 
A Washington case Wyman v. Wallace. 615 P.2d 452 (Washington 
1980), explains the nature and role of judicially noticed legislative facts: 
trial courts and appellate courts can take notice of 
"legislative facts" ~ social, economic and 
scientific facts that "simply supply premises in the 
process of legal reasoning." [citations omitted] 
Under this doctrine a court can take notice of 
scholarly works, scientific studies, and social 
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facts, [citations omitted] This legislative fact 
doctrine is expressly recognized by both the state 
[Washington] and federal rules of evidence, in 
establishing strict requirements for judicial notice 
of "adjudicative facts", the state and federal rules 
carefully ensure that their requirements will no_£ 
also restrict notice of "legislative facts". 
Wyman at 454. Evidence of such legislative facts was before the court in 
the form of the uniform guidelines, to which the court made frequent 
reference and of which the court displayed a working knowledge. The 
plaintiff/respondent now invites this court to look at the three children 
guidelines as contained in Appendix "B". For each an every one of the 
income levels displayed at the far left hand side of both columns of the 
page, there are three corresponding figures, each of which refers to the age 
of the child in question. The age groups are "0-6", "7-15" and "16-18". If 
the court will direct its attention to each income entry on this page, it will 
note that the amount of support for each income level increases as the 
child's age increases from category to category. For example, If the 
income amount were "3000", a child between the years of "0-6" would 
receive $212, a child between the years of "7-15" would receive $258 and a 
child between "16-18" would receive $300. The consistency of this trend, 
together with the broad and substantial scientific, economic and 
sociological base of the studies and fact-finding that went into the 
formulation of the guidelines, supports the conclusion that the guidelines 
are "legislative facts", appropriate subjects for judicial notice free of the 
restraints of that called for when addressing adjudicative facts. The court 
did not abuse its discretion in judicially noticing such facts. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the court should have treated the fact of 
increased support expense commensurate with increased age as an 
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"adjudicative fact", there is ample case law that supports the court's 
findings on this subject. In Wright v Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah court stated: 
We have previously held that such [material 
changes] have occurred when there is an increase 
in the father's ability to support his children, or 
where the children grow older and require 
additional support to properly maintain them. 
Wright at 445, (citations omitted). In the case of Craven v. Craven. 229 
P.2d 301 (Utah 1951) the court found the age of the child in question to be 
a significant factor: 
After a careful examination of the petition and the 
evidence, we conclude that the modification of the 
lower court must be sustained. In her petition the 
respondent alleged (1) that me child of the parties 
had grown from infancy to the age of five years 
and four months with the result that he requires 
"much more" food, clothing and medical care: (2) 
that since the entry of the original decree in 
April. 1945. the price of food, clothing, housing 
accommodations and all other items which are 
necessary for the proper care and support of the 
child had "greatly increased". 
Craven at 302, emphasis added. The court went on to confirm the 
allegations mentioned above. 
In addition to case law which supports the proposition that the cost of 
supporting a child increases as the child's age increases, the 
plaintiff/respondent offered uncontroverted testimony that such was the 
actual case with reference to the subject children. As was mentioned in the 
statement of facts, the costs of providing food, clothing, activities and 
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medical care to Chris and Craig have increased during the past ten years. 
When asked if the boys ate more than they did as toddlers, the 
plaintiff/respondent replied "definitely". (T. 67) 
In arguing against the fact that, pursuant to the rules of evidence 
governing judicial notice of adjudicative facts, the determination that the 
expense of supporting children increases as they age is unreasonable, 
respondent asserts that perhaps appellant has never dined regularly with a 
teenager or perhaps never was one. As the court correctly found, 
teenagers simply are more expensive to raise. 
The court appropriately found this to be a proper subject of judicial 
notice, as a "legislative fact", or in the alternative, as a "adjudicative fact", 
and in any case, there was independent, uncontroverted evidence 
supporting the finding independent of considerations of judicial notice. 
COMMENTARY ON APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appellant raises points in his brief, irrelevant to the issues herein 
raised and not supported by the evidence admitted below, to which 
respondent objects as being offensive. At page 15 of his brief, appellant 
states: 
It may be that greater funds are generally 
committed to older children, but it may also be 
that those funds do not fall within the realm of 
"reasonable and necessary", but fall within the 
realm of discretionary, or helpful, and reflect a 
refusal of the parent to require and encourage the 
child to provide for itself and be a productive part 
of the family unit. In addition, it is only the 
current popular lax attitude of parents that does 
not rigorously demand a contribution both in 
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services and economics to the maintenance of a 
household and a living environment. 
The custody of the children or the fitness of the plaintiff as their custodial 
parent and mother was not at issue. There are no facts supporting such 
accusations. Appellant did not assert at trial that respondent did not 
adequately care for or instruct the children in family rules, or did not teach 
the children to be "productive" members of the family unit. Such 
moralization has no proper place in these proceedings. 
The appellant failed, and has failed to make a material showing of 
"undue hardship", and therefore his assertion that the application of the 
guidelines was reversible error is unfounded and unsubstantiated by the 
record or by appellant's brief. Appellant has the burden of marshalling all 
of the facts to support his appeal, and has failed to do so. 
In addition to bearing the burden of marshalling facts, the appellant 
must bring forth applicable law to establish a standard of both review by 
the appellate court and the standards by which the trial court was to 
proceed below. Appellant has cited no standard of review and cited only 
the Stettler case in establishing the rule that modification be granted upon 
a showing of a material change of circumstances not contemplated in the 
decree itself. The so-called "rule of theHunter case" is not only an 
invention, but fails to state a workable rule of law that can be established 
by this court. (See appellant's brief at 12, and Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 
430 (Utah 1983)) In direct contravention to the "rule of the Hunter case", 
respondent cites Wiker v. Wiker. 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978) which states: 
[N]o one has any vested rights in a support decree 
which statutorily may be changed from time to 
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time by a court under its continuing jurisdiction 
in such matters. 
Wiker at 515. While there may be a general notion that a child has a right 
to claim support from its parent, such is not the issue here. The issues is: 
does a child, or anyone else, have a vested right to support which is 
founded only upon the decree of divorce itself? The answer, as supplied in 
Wiker. is "no". This does not mean that child support rights cannot flow 
out from a decree of divorce, but simply means that such support rights in 
the child are not found in the decree itself. As stated in Coleman v. 
Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983): 
Installments of support payments ordered in a 
divorce decree become vested in the recipient 
when the become due. 
Coleman at 1157. In short, although the subject children have a general 
right to support from their parents, they have no rights to such pursuant to 
a decree of divorce. The general right of a child to support is independent 
of a decree of divorce. It would be no excuse for a parent to raise that it 
failed to support a child when it had the means to, simply because the other 
parent, who was obligated under a decree of divorce to pay for the support 
of the children, had failed to do so. The general right is independent of a 
decree of divorce. In contrast, there are no vested rights to a fixed amount 
of support pursuant to decree of divorce until the payment of such 
becomes due, and then the right is one of collection of a past due debt, not 
a right to support. Appellant is misguided when he argues that Craig can 
enforce the decree of divorce, or that his grandparents may do so. The 
decree is between the parties and can be enforced by them alone. Not only 
did the defendant/appellant fail to request that the court require the 
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payment of support directly to the grandparents or to Craig himself, but 
such would not be in harmony with the rules of law just stated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The court appropriately found that there had been a material change 
of circumstances not contemplated in the original decree of divorce. 
According to the rules governing the modification of an award of support, 
the court properly proceeded to modify the same. Furthermore, the court 
properly elected to employ the uniform guidelines in formulating the 
increase in support. The court had heard evidence as required by statute, 
case law and the guidelines themselves, representing a totality of present 
circumstances to the court. The court properly took judicial notice of the 
fact that the cost of supporting children increases as they age. Such was a 
societal fact, a legislative fact, not governed by the strict rules of judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. Even if the facts in question are found to be 
adjudicative rather than legislative, they nevertheless met the legal test 
supplied for adjudicative facts. Finally, the finding could be made, and 
perhaps was made, independently, upon the testimony of the 
plaintiff/respondent. As such, there was not error. The appellant has 
failed to meet the burden of proving clear abuse of discretion, and as such 
is not entitled to relief by this court. 
Appellant, in failing to establish the appropriate standard of review 
in his appeal, and in failing to marshall law supportive of his appeal, has 
worked a hardship upon the plaintiff/respondent that has increased her 
costs in this appeal. For this reason, plaintiff/respondent not only moves 
that this appeal be vacated, but that she further receive the sum of $1500 in 
reasonable costs and fees of appeal, incurred by the appellant's failure to 
18 
carry the affirmative burdens of establishing the scope and nature of his 
appeal, as required by case law. ^ O 
Respectfully submitted this h day of ifZ^Jrfaw'U'. 1989. 
Jsm* M *-?miM'A*U^\. 
iphraim H. Fankhauser / 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that if true and correct copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, this £ day of 
{P&fafcu^. 1989 to: 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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D E C R E E O F 
D I V O R C E 
MORRIS D. YOUNG f9 ** 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
250 South Mam Street N 
Tooele, Utah 84074 N 
Telephone: 882-1618 ^
 (* ) 
*' i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT . ^* 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH .1*^^ 
ooOoo 
MARILYN J. DURFEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK W. DURFEE, 
Defendant. : Civil No. 9429 
ooOoo 
This natter came on regularly for hearing before tie 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin on the 13th day of November, 1978. 
The Stipulation of the parties was accepted and the default of 
the defendant was entered. More than three months ha^e expired 
since the filing of the Complaint. The Plaintiff appeared in 
person and was represented by her attorney, Morris D. Young. 
Pursuant to the foregoing and the Plaintiff having presented tes-
timony in open court in support of her complaint and the Court 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between MARILYN J. DURFEE, Plaintiff, and FRANK W. DURFEE, De-
fendant, be and the same are hereby dissolved provided that this 
decree shall not become final until three months from the date 
of the filing of said decree during which time neither of the 
parties are to remarry, which decree will become final without 
further proceedings unless either of the parties hereto or the 
Court on its motion institutes further proceedings herein. 
2. The care, custody, and control of the minor chil-
dren of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff subject to rights 
of visitation at all reasonable times and Dlaces in tne defendant. 
C***\ , A (1) 
3. Defendant is required to pay plaintiff $150.00 per 
month per child for the support of the two minor children of the 
parties and $1.00 per year as alimony. 
4. Defendant is required to pay plaintiff $500.00 to 
help her to secure reliable transportation to enable her to seek 
employment and to go back and forth to work after she does obtain 
employment. 
5. The home of the parties located at 310 South Cooley 
Street, Grantsville, Utah, is to be sold and the following obliga-
tions of the parties are to be paid from the proceeds of the sale 
of said real property: 
a. The balance owing to Morris D. Young as attorney 
fees. 
$1,200.00. 
b. Zions Mortgage Company, approximately $2 5,000.00. 
c. Rolfe Assay for the down payment, approximately 
d. Blazer Finance Company for the furniture of 
the parties, approximately $1,800.00. 
e. First Security Bank Visa Card, $500.00. 
6. In addition, the following obligations of the defen-
dant are to be paid from the Droceeds of the sale of the real 
property of the parties: 
a. Commercial Security Bank Mastercharge, $500.00. 
b. Commercial Security Bank Checkard, $500.00. 
c. Bryner Clinic, $20.00. 
do Dr. Kirk, $20.00. 
e. Salt Lake Clinic, about $100.00. 
f. Tooele Clinic, about $50.00. 
g. Dr. A. Jay DeLaMare, about $3 50.00. 
h. Any miscellaneous small bill or obligation that 
may have been incurred as a family expense. 
7. Any remaining equity derived from the sale of the 
home of the parties is to then be divided equally, half to each 
of the parties herein. 
C w 25 
8. Defendant is required to pay the following obligation 
from his separate funds: 
a. Laury Miller Pontiac, about $7,000.00. 
9. The following personal property is awarded to the 
plaintiff: 
a. Four rooms of miscellaneous furniture and house-
hold equipment including the portable air conditioner. 
b. Plaintiff's own personal belongings and effects. 
c. The personal belongings and effects of the 
children of the parties. 
10. The following personal property is awarded to the 
defendant: 
a. 1978 Pontiac automobile. 
b. Pool table and fish acquarium. 
c. The downstairs miscellaneous furniture. 
d. Miscellaneous guns and sporting equipment. 
e. Defendant's own personal belongings and effects. 
11. Defendant is ordered to keep his health and accident 
insurance in full force and effect and to maintain the medical 
coverage on the children of the parties. 
12. The state and federal income tax refunds that the 
parties have coming are to be divided equally between the parties. 
13. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against this defen-
dant in the sum of $300.00 for attorney fees and costs of court 
incurred herein for the prosecution of this matter. 
Dated this ^ — / daY of November, 1978. 
Filed this day of November, 1978. 
C Z "l •. 2*6 
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SELECTIONS FROM APPLICABLE UNIFORM CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
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T^tl- State of Utah 5/12/88 
r- JbTne'cT Support Amount ($ per Child) CA0j?bi"e,d 
S S £ & Age Group Adjusted 
Gross ~ ~ IC'TQ 
Income ($) 0-6 7-15 16-18 
Gross 
Income ($) 
Support Amount ($ per Child) 
Age Group 
0-6 7-15 16-18 
0-50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
450 
500 
550 
600 
650 
700 
750 
800 
850 
900 
950 
1000 
1050 
1100 
1150 
1200 
1250 
1300 
1350 
1400 
1450 
1500 
1550 
1600 
1650 
1700 
1750 
1800 
1850 
1900 
1950 
2000 
2100 
2200 
2300 
2400 
2500 
2600 
2700 
2800 
2900 
3000 
7 
13 
18 
23 
27 
31 
34 
36 
39 
42 
44 
47 
50 
52 
55 
59 
63 
68 
72 
76 
80 
84 
87 
91 
95 
99 
103 
107 
111 
114 
118 
122 
126 
129 
133 
136 
138 
141 
143 
146 
151 
156 
163 
170 
177 
184 
191 
198 
205 
212 
8 
15 
21 
27 
33 
37 
41 
44 
48 
51 
55 
58 
62 
65 
69 
74 
79 
84 
89 
93 
98 
103 
107 
112 
117 
121 
126 
131 
135 
140 
144 
149 
153 
158 
162 
165 
168 
172 
175 
178 
185 
191 
199 
208 
216 
225 
233 
241 
250 
258 
9 
17 
24 
31 
38 
43 
47 
52 
56 
61 
65 
69 
73 
77 
82 
88 
93 
99 
104 
110 
115 
121 
126 
131 
137 
142 
147 
153 
158 
163 
168 
173 
178 
184 
188 
192 
196 
200 
204 
208 
216 
224 
233 
243 
253 
262 
272 
281 
291 
300 
3100 
3200 
3300 
3400 
3500 
3600 
3700 
3800 
3900 
4000 
4100 
4200 
4300 
4400 
4500 
4600 
4700 
4800 
4900 
5000 
5100 
5200 
5300 
5400 
5500 
5600 
5700 
5800 
5900 
6000 
6200 
6400 
6600 
6800 
7000 
7200 
7400 
7600 
7800 
8000 
8200 
8400 
8600 
8800 
9000 
9200 
9400 
9600 
9800 
10000 
219 
226 
233 
239 
246 
253 
260 
266 
273 
278 
284 
290 
296 
302 
309 
315 
322 
328 
335 
341 
347 
354 
360 
367 
373 
379 
386 
392 
398 
405 
417 
430 
442 
455 
467 
479 
492 
504 
516 
528 
540 
552 
564 
578 
591 
604 
616 
628 
640 
652 
266 
274 
282 
290 
299 
307 
315 
323 
330 
337 
344 
351 
358 
366 
374 
382 
389 
397 
405 
412 
420 
428 
435 
443 
451 
458 
466 
473 
481 
488 
503 
518 
533 
548 
563 
577 
592 
607 
621 
636 
650 
664 
679 
694 
710 
725 
740 
754 
768 
782 
310 
319 
329 
338 
347 
356 
366 
375 
384 
392 
400 
408 
417 
425 
434 
443 
452 
461 
470 
479 
488 
496 
505 
514 
523 
531 
540 
549 
557 
566 
583 
600 
618 
635 
651 
668 
685 
702 
719 
735 
752 
768 
785 
803 
821 
838 
854 
870 
887 
903 
These schedule* are to be used with the Child Support Obligation Worksheet Award amounts have been adjusted to ruipncv 
